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ORIGINAL RESEARCH REPORT
Advanced Aging Enhances the Positivity Effect in 
Memory: Due to Cognitive Control or Age-Related 
Decline in Emotional Processing?
Michiko Sakaki*,†, Jasmine A. L. Raw*, Jamie Findlay* and Mariel Thottam*
Older adults typically remember more positive than negative information compared to their younger 
counterparts; a phenomenon referred to as the ‘positivity effect.’ According to the socioemotional 
selectivity theory (SST), the positivity effect derives from the age-related motivational shift towards 
attaining emotionally meaningful goals which become more important as the perception of future time 
becomes more limited. Cognitive control mechanisms are critical in achieving such goals and therefore 
SST predicts that the positivity effect is associated with preserved cognitive control mechanisms in 
older adults. In contrast, the aging-brain model suggests that the positivity effect is driven by an age-
related decline in the amygdala which is responsible for emotional processing and emotional learning. The 
aim of the current research was to address whether the age-related positivity effect is associated with 
cognitive control or impaired emotional processing associated with aging. We included older old adults, 
younger old adults and younger adults and tested their memory for emotional stimuli, cognitive control 
and amygdala-dependent fear conditioned responses. Consistent with prior research, older adults, relative 
to younger adults, demonstrate better memory for positive over negative images. We further found that 
within a group of older adults, the positivity effect increases as a function of age, such that older old 
adults demonstrated a greater positivity effect compared to younger older adults. Furthermore, the 
positivity effect in older old adults was associated with preserved cognitive control, supporting the 
prediction of SST. Contrary to the prediction of the aging-brain model, participants across all groups 
demonstrated similar enhanced skin conductance responses to fear conditioned stimuli – responses known 
to rely on the amygdala. Our results support SST and suggest that the positivity effect in older adults is 
achieved by the preserved cognitive control mechanisms and is not a reflection of the impaired emotional 
function associated with age.
Keywords: Emotion and memory; Positivity effect; Aging; Fear conditioning; Emotion regulation; Stroop
Introduction
Older adults, compared with younger adults, tend to pay 
attention to and remember more positive than negative 
information (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Grühn, 
Scheibe, & Baltes, 2007; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, 
& Wilson, 2006; Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014; Riediger, 
Schmiedek, Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2009). This age-by-
valence interaction is called the ‘positivity effect’ and has 
been explained by motivational shifts in aging (Scheibe 
& Carstensen, 2010). According to the socioemotional 
selectivity theory (SST), as individuals age, they perceive 
time left in their life as being more limited. As a result, 
older adults, relative to younger adults, are more likely 
to prioritize emotion regulation goals over other goals. 
This motivational shift is thought to result in the positivity 
effect.
In line with SST, older adults’ positivity effects do not 
emerge when they have limited cognitive resources to 
regulate their emotion (Mather & Knight, 2005; Petrican, 
Moscovitch, & Schimmack, 2008). Older adults’ positivity 
effects are also weakened when their motivations are 
manipulated to focus on goals other than emotion 
regulation (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007) or when they 
are directed to think of their future as being expansive 
(Barber, Opitz, Martins, Sakaki, & Mather, 2016; Kellough 
& Knight, 2012). In addition, a positivity preference in 
memory can be observed in younger adults by directing 
them to think their time as being limited (Barber et al., 
2016; Kellough & Knight, 2012).
According to SST, advancing age should be associated 
with one’s perception of limited time left in their life. 
Therefore, there should be a positive correlation between 
the positivity effect in memory and/or attention and 
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age. However, previous research has not always provided 
evidence consistent with this prediction (but see English 
& Carstensen, 2015). For example, when individuals aged 
older than 60 were categorized into those who are relatively 
young (i.e., younger old adults) and those who are relatively 
older (i.e., older old adults), older older adults were less 
likely to have positive biases than younger old adults in 
feedback-based learning (M. J. Frank & Kong, 2008; Simon, 
Howard, & Howard, 2010). When older adults’ emotional 
experiences were longitudinally examined (Carstensen 
et al., 2011), positive experiences peaked at age 64 at 
which point positive emotional experiences then began to 
decrease with age (see also Gana, Saada, & Amieva, 2015; 
Jivraj, Nazroo, Vanhoutte, & Chandola, 2014).
These findings may be explained by the age-related 
impairment in cognitive control. As mentioned above, 
the cognitive control mechanisms are critical in achieving 
emotion regulation (Opitz, Gross, & Urry, 2012) and the 
positivity effect is attenuated when older adults have limited 
cognitive resources (Mather & Knight, 2005; Petrican et 
al., 2008). Of note, cognitive control is one of the most 
vulnerable processes of age-related decline (e.g., Milham 
et al., 2002) and therefore the impaired cognitive control 
mechanisms may obscure the positivity effects in old age. 
The first objective of the present study is to test whether 
the positivity effect becomes stronger as individuals get 
older within older adults and whether such effects of age 
within older adults are mediated by their cognitive control 
mechanisms. To this end, we tested memory for positive, 
negative and neutral stimuli in younger and older adults 
ensuring that a wide age range in older adults was covered. 
We also included the Stroop task to test their cognitive 
control functioning (West & Alain, 2000).
The present study also aimed to test a prediction 
made by an alternative theory for the positivity effect. 
Cacioppo and colleagues suggested the aging-brain model 
which posits that normal aging is associated with neural 
degeneration of the amygdala. This amygdala degeneration 
is considered to result in decreased amygdala activity 
to negative stimuli, leading to the selective impaired 
processing of negative stimuli in older adults (Cacioppo, 
Berntson, Bechara, Tranel, & Hawkley, 2011). Contrary to 
the prediction of the aging-brain model, previous research 
has shown that fear conditioning – which is known to rely 
on the amygdala (Delgado, Olsson, & Phelps, 2006) – is 
preserved in older adults (LaBar, Cook, Torpey, & Welsh-
Bohmer, 2004; Lee et al., 2018). However, fear conditioning 
and the positivity effect in attention or memory are often 
studied separately and have never been studied within the 
same sample, making it difficult to examine whether and 
how strongly the age-related positivity effect in attention 
and/or memory is related to fear conditioning. In the 
current study, we included a fear conditioning task and 
examined whether the positivity effect is associated with 
weaker/impaired fear conditioned responses as predicted 
by the aging-brain hypothesis.
Methods
Participants
Participants included 46 older adults (26 females; age 
range: 57–87; Mage = 72.43, SD = 6.61) and 45 younger 
adults (41 females; age range: 18–23; Mage = 19.71, 
SD = 1.24). The sample size was determined not only to 
have the statistical power of .80 to detect the medium-
sized differences between younger and older adults in 
the effects of valence on memory documented in the 
literature (Reed et al., 2014) but also to detect medium- 
to large- sized correlations within each age group. Older 
adults were recruited from the Ageing Research Panel 
at the University of Reading and the local area around 
Reading, Berkshire, UK, ensuring a wide age range 
was covered. Younger adults were undergraduate and 
graduate students at the University of Reading. Potential 
participants were excluded if they reported that they 
had cognitive impairments, did not have normal or 
corrected vision and hearing, and were not able to speak 
English fluently. To make sure the administration of 
electrical stimulation was done safely (see Procedures), 
participants were screened so that they did not have 
post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, heart 
disease, peripheral vascular disease, diabetes, Reynaud’s 
phenomenon, cryglobulinemia, vasculitis, lupus, or 
tingling or numbness in hands and/or feet, or any serious 
chronic illness and they did not use psychoactive drugs, 
beta-blocker medication or corticosteroid medication. 
Participants were not screened for color blindness. Three 
participants (2 older adults and 1 younger adult) showed 
almost 0% accuracy in incongruent trials (<.05%) and 
almost 100% accuracy in congruent trials (>.95%) in 
the Stroop task (see Procedures); indicating that they 
did not understand or follow the instructions of the 
Stroop task and just responded to the words ignoring 
the font colors. Data from the three participants were 
excluded from the analyses reported in this paper. 
Analyses were thus performed on data from 44 older 
adults (24 females; age range: 57–87; Mage = 72.38, SD 
= 6.75) and 44 younger adults (40 females; age range: 
18–23; Mage = 19.73, SD = 1.25). Participants signed the 
consent form approved by the University Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Reading. Participants 
received £7/hour or course credits.
Materials
Fifteen positive, 15 negative and 15 neutral images 
obtained from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) were used in the 
study. The IAPS has normative ratings of arousal and 
valence. The average valence ratings were 7.45 (SD = .34) 
for the positive images, 5.05 (SD = 0.32) for the neutral 
images and 2.71 (SD = 0.69) for the negative images. The 
mean arousal level was matched between the negative 
and the positive images (Mneg = 5.35, SD = .92; Mpos = 5.34, 
SD = .79), and both positive and negative images were 
more arousing than neutral images (M = 3.22, SD = .62).
Procedures
Participants completed two sessions that were on average 
one week apart (M = 6.58 days). In the first session, 
participants completed a questionnaire on life satisfaction 
(Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), followed by the 
Stroop task, where they were shown words and asked to 
identify their font colors (i.e., red, blue, green and purple) 
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by pressing one of four keys that had corresponding colored 
stickers. The words “red,” “blue,” “green” and “purple” were 
sometimes shown in the font color consistent with the word 
(congruent trials; e.g., “red” in red) and sometimes shown 
in a different font color (incongruent trials; e.g., “red” in 
blue). There were 60 congruent trials and 60 incongruent 
trials. In each trial, participants were shown a word for 1.25 
sec, followed by a 750 ms blank screen. They were asked to 
respond as quickly and as accurately possible.
Next, participants were shown 45 IAPS images in a 
random order; each image was presented for 2 sec. Half of 
the images from each valence condition had a red frame 
and the other images had a yellow frame. Participants were 
asked to indicate whether the image had a red or yellow 
frame by key press (“r” key for the red frame and “y” key for 
the yellow frame) as done in a previous study (Barber et 
al., 2016). After the picture viewing task, they completed 
Sudoku puzzles for 3 min, followed by a self-paced free 
recall task. During the free recall task, participants were 
asked to describe aloud as many of the images that they 
had seen in the earlier session that they could possibly 
remember without any time limit. The experimenter 
typed participants’ responses into the computer. After 
the free recall task, older adults also completed the mini-
mental state examination (MMSE; Folstein, Robins, & 
Helzer, 1983); two older adults did not complete MMSE.
In the second session, participants completed the 
Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and the Center for Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), followed 
by a fear conditioning procedure. Conditioned stimuli (CS) 
were two neutral tones that were different in their pitches; 
which tone was used as CS+ was counterbalanced across 
participants. The US was electric stimulation. The fear 
conditioning task included 36 trials in a randomized order 
(12 trials for CS+ with shock, 12 trials for CS+ without 
shock and 12 trials for CS–). On each trial, participants 
were presented with CS+ or CS– for 500 ms and pressed a 
key to indicate whether the tone was high- or low- pitched. 
After a 400-ms blank screen, participants received a shock 
for 0.4 sec in the CS+ with shock trials. Each trial ended 
with a jittered fixation cross (6, 8, or 10 sec). Prior to the 
task, participants were informed which tone was predictive 
of shock but were not informed of the probability of 
shock. After the fear conditioning task, participants also 
completed the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; 
Wechsler, 2001) which allowed us to estimate their IQ. 
Participants were fully debriefed after the experiment.
Electric shock and skin conductance
Electric stimulation was delivered to the fourth finger of 
the left hand as US via a shock stimulator (Powerlab 26T, 
AD Instrument Ltd, Oxford, UK). Prior to the experiment, 
we determined the intensity of “highly unpleasant but not 
painful” electric stimulation for each participant (older 
adults: M = 6.33 mA; SD = 3.31; younger adults: M = 4.07 
mA; SD = 1.67). The level determined was used throughout 
the experiment as the US. SCR data were recorded at 1 k Hz 
sampling rates through the Powerlab 26T system.
SCR data epochs were extracted from a time 
window between 0 and 10 sec after CS tone onset, and 
baseline-corrected between 0 and 1 sec. The peak SCR 
amplitude was taken between 2 and 8 sec from the trial-
by-trial average SCR epoch as a function of CS tone. To 
examine the effects of conditioning, rather than shock 
itself, our SCR analysis focused on SCR between the CS+ 
without shock condition and the CS– condition. Due to 
technical problems, SCR data from two participants were 
not recorded; thus, data from these participants were not 
included in the SCR analysis.
Free recall coding
Participants’ responses in the free-recall test were matched 
to the corresponding images by two independent coders. 
Participants’ responses were randomly divided into two 
sets and each coder coded responses from one of the two 
sets. 35% of responses were randomly selected within 
each age group and were coded by both of the two coders. 
They agreed on 91.86% of these responses. The coders 
met and reached consensus over the discrepancies. 
Corresponding images were not identified for 11% 
of responses when responses were too vague (e.g., “a 
photograph of some children”; “a man and a woman”) or 
referred to something which was not shown during the 
picture presentation session.
Results
All analyses were performed with SAS ver 9.4 (SAS 
Institute, Cary, NC, USA).
Picture recall
Younger adults generated more responses than did older 
adults during the free recall task (Mold = 6.89, SD = 4.05 
vs. Myoung = 8.66, SD = 3.14), F(1, 86) = 5.27, p = .02, η2 = 
.06. While the difference was not significant, the ratio for 
responses that could not be matched was higher for older 
than for younger adults (Mold = .15, SD = .21 vs. Myoung = 
.09, SD = .13; p = .15). To account for these general age-
related differences in memory performance, we obtained 
a proportion of images participants remembered for each 
valence category based on the total number of images 
that the participant recalled (e.g., Barber et al., 2016).
A 2 (age group: young, old) × 3 (valence: negative, 
positive vs. neutral) ANOVA was performed on the 
proportion of images recalled (Figure 1A). This ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of valence, F(2, 172) = 27.34, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .32, and an age-by-valence interaction, 
F(2, 172) = 4.58, p = .01, ηp
2 = .05. Subsequent analyses 
revealed that older adults recalled a smaller proportion 
of negative images compared with younger adults (Mold = 
.29, SD = .22 vs. Myoung = .42, SD = .17), F(1, 86) = 9.32, 
p = .003, η2 = .10. The groups did not significantly differ 
for positive (p = .40; Mold = .41, SD = .25 vs. Myoung = .38, 
SD = .16) and neutral images (p = .09; Mold = .19, SD = .21 
vs. Myoung = .12, SD = .12). Thus, we replicated the reduced 
memory performance for negative stimuli in older adults 
relative to younger adults as observed in previous studies 
(e.g., Charles et al., 2003; Grühn et al., 2007).
Next, we examined whether the positivity effect 
increases with age within older adults. To address this issue, 
we obtained a memory positivity score by subtracting 
the proportion of negative images remembered from 
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the proportion of positive images recalled. This memory 
positivity score was significantly correlated with age within 
older adults (Figure 2), r(42) = .32, p = .03, suggesting that 
the positivity effect becomes stronger as individuals get 
older. To further confirm this, we split older adults based 
on the median age (72.5; see Table 1). A 3 (age group: 
young, young-old, vs. old-old) × 3 (valence) ANOVA on 
the proportion of images recalled (Figure 1B) revealed a 
significant effect of valence, F(2, 170) = 22.97, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .27, and a significant interaction between age and 
Figure 1: (A) Performance in the free recall test for younger and older adults. (B) The results from the free recall test 
when older adults were further categorized into older old adults (older than 72) and younger old adults (aged 72 
or younger).
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Figure 2: Relationship between memory positivity and age. Within the group of older adults, there was a positive 
correlation between age and memory positivity.
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valence, F(4, 170) = 5.24, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12. Subsequent 
analyses conducted separately for each valence condition 
revealed significant effects of age groups for positive, F(2, 
85) = 4.88, p = .01, η2 = .10, and negative images, F(2, 85) 
= 7.14, p = .001, η2 = .14, but not for neutral images (p 
= .14). Older old adults remembered a greater proportion 
of positive images (M = .50, SD = .29) compared to the 
proportions remembered by younger old adults and 
younger adults (Myounger-old = .32, SD = .15; Myoung = .38, SD 
= .16), t(85) = 3.02, p = .01, t(85) = 2.41, p = .048 (Tukey), 
and remembered a smaller proportion of negative images 
(Mold-old = .23, SD = .25) compared to younger adults (Myoung 
= .42, SD = .17), t(85) = 3.78, p < .001 (Tukey). Older old 
adults also remembered a smaller proportion of negative 
images than younger old adults (Myoung-old = .35, SD = .17) 
but the difference did not reach significance after applying 
the Tukey multiple comparison test, t(85) = 2.13, p = .09 
(Tukey). Younger old adults did not significantly differ from 
younger adults across all valence categories (ps > .10).
These results suggest that the positivity effect in memory 
increases over the course of aging. In addition, while the 
age effects were stronger for negative images than positive 
images when we compared younger vs. older adults as 
described in the previous paragraph, this additional 
analysis revealed that older old adults remembered more 
positive images than younger old adults and younger 
adults. Thus, results from this additional analysis suggests 
that old age is associated with a larger proportion of 
positive stimuli recalled as well as a smaller proportion of 
negative stimuli recalled. In summary, the positivity effect 
in memory appears to steadily increase with age. The 
interaction between age and valence remained significant 
even after controlling for the effects of positive affect 
from PANAS, negative affect from PANAS, WTAR scores, 
and their interactions with the three age groups, F(4, 164) 
= 4.46, p = .002, ηp
2 = .11.
Effects of Stroop performance on memory positivity
For each condition for each participant, trials with outlier 
reaction times were defined based on 2 SDs above the 
mean in the Stroop task. After removing these outlier trials, 
we obtained the mean accuracy for the congruent and 
incongruent trials during the Stroop task. An interference 
score was then obtained by subtracting accuracy in the 
incongruent trials from accuracy in the congruent trials. 
The interference score was significantly different across 
the three age groups, F(2, 85) = 5.41, p = .007, η2 = .11, 
such that older old adults (M = .09, SD = .09) and younger 
old adults (M = .08, SD = .07) had a higher interference 
score than did younger adults (M = .04, SD = .05), t(85) = 
2.96, p < .01, t(85) = 2.35, p = 05 (Tukey). The two older 
adult groups were not significantly different (p = .86).
To examine whether preserved cognitive control is 
critical for older adults’ positivity effect in memory, we 
next ran a general linear modelling (GLM) analysis on the 
memory positivity score. Independent variables included 
the three age groups, the Stroop interference score (as a 
continuous variable), and the interaction between them. 
This analysis confirmed the significant effect of age, 
F(2, 82) = 10.24, p < .001, η2 = .20, consistent with the 
results from previous ANOVAs. The main effect of Stroop 
interference score was not significant (p = .76). More 
interestingly, there was a significant interaction between 
age group and the interference score, F(2, 82) = 3.33, 
p = .04, η2 = .06. Since there were some possible outliers 
(see Figure 3), we used Spearman correlation coefficients 
to test the correlation between the interference score 
and memory positivity score for each group to reduce the 
effects of these outliers. The results indicated that in older 
old adults, the lower interference scores were associated 
with stronger positive memory, ρ(21) = –.42, p = .05. In 
contrast, the correlation was not significant either in 
younger adults or in younger old adults (ps > .20). These 
results suggest that the preserved cognitive control 
mechanisms are important especially for older old adults 
to show the positivity effect.
Fear conditioning
Participants’ SCRs were submitted to a 2 (cue: CS+ 
vs. CS–) × 3 (age groups: older old, young old, young) 
ANOVA. There was a significant effect of cue, F (1, 83) = 
7.56, p = .007, ηp
2 = .09, reflecting stronger SCRs to CS+ 
than CS–. Neither the main effect of age (p = .70) nor the 
interaction (p = .32) was significant. In fact, both older old 
adults, t(20) = 2.35, p = .03, and younger adults, t(42) = 
2.63, p = .01, showed the enhanced SCRs to CS+ than CS– 
(Figure 4). While the difference did not reach significance, 
younger old adults also showed the same pattern, t(21) = 
1.73, p = .099. Within older adults, the difference in SCR 
between CS+ and CS– was not significantly associated 
with age, nor with the memory positivity score (ps > .50).
To further confirm that the Stroop interference score 
is more critical than the fear responses acquired during 
conditioning for the age-related positivity effect, we ran 
a similar GLM analysis to the one used for the Stroop 
and memory positivity, while including the acquired 
fear responses in conditioning (i.e., the difference in 
SCR between CS+ and CS–) as a covariate. This analysis 
confirmed a significant interaction between age and the 
Stroop interference score, F(2, 79) = 3.22, p = .045, η2 = .08. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the preserved 
Table 1: Demographic measures and results in cognitive 
and self-reported questionnaires.
Young Younger old Older old
Age 19.73 (1.25) 67.00 (4.11) 77.77 (3.95)
Sex 
(females/males)
40/4 11/11 13/9
MMSE – 28.10 (1.09) 27.81 (1.60)
WTAR 40.00 (5.63) 48.95 (1.25) 48.36 (1.92)
Positive affect 2.76 (0.66) 3.09 (0.68) 3.44 (0.73)
Negative affect 1.40 (0.49) 1.22 (0.27) 1.17 (0.24)
CES-D 0.84 (0.37) 0.73 (0.50) 0.76 (0.33)
Life satisfaction 4.88 (0.85) 4.95 (1.04) 5.10 (0.98)
Note: Standard deviations (SD) are in parentheses. MMSE stands 
for the mini-mental state examination; WTAR stands for the 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading and CES-D stands for the 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.
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Figure 3: Relationship between memory positivity and the interference score from the Stroop task in (A) older old 
adults, (B) younger old adults and (C) younger adults. Possible outliers are pointed by a red arrow.
Figure 4: Skin conductance response to a fear conditioned tone (CS+) or a neutral tone (CS–) across the age groups.
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cognitive control mechanisms are more important than 
the preserved fear learning mechanisms for older adults 
to demonstrate the positivity effect.
Other questionnaires and cognitive tasks
Participants’ performance in other cognitive tests and 
self-reported questionnaires is shown in Table 1. The 
three age groups significantly differed in WTAR, F(2, 85) = 
47.74, p < .001, η2 = .53, reflecting poorer performance for 
younger adults compared to the two older adult groups, 
ts(85) = 7.70, 8.24, ps < .001 (Tukey). In addition, the 
three groups differed in PANAS positive affect, F(2, 85) = 
7.43, p = .001, η2 = .15, and in PANAS negative affect, F(2, 
85) = 3.08, p = .05, η2 = .07. Older old adults reported a 
stronger positive affect than younger adults did, t(85) = 
3.81, p < .001 (Tukey), and although it was not significant, 
there was a trend for reduced negative affect in older old 
adults than younger adults, t(84) = 2.24, p = .07 (Tukey). 
The groups did not significantly differ in depression (p 
= .55) or life satisfaction (p = .67). The WTAR and MMSE 
scores were not significantly correlated with the Stroop 
interference scores in any of the three groups (ps > .35).
While the two older adult groups did not differ in 
the average MMSE score (p = .50), one participant 
in the older old group showed a MMSE score of 25 
which is below the cut-off (26) for possible cognitive 
impairments (Perneczky, Wagenpfeil, Komossa, Grimmer, 
& et al., 2006). To confirm that the results reported in 
the paper were not due to this particular participant, we 
ran our main analyses after removing this participant. A 
2 (age group: young, old) × 3 (valence) ANOVA on the 
proportion of images recalled replicated the age-by-
valence interaction, F(2, 170) = 4.30, p = .02, ηp
2 = .05. 
Within older adults, age was also positively correlated 
with the memory positivity score, r(41) = .32, p = .04, 
even without this possible dementia case. A GLM 
analysis on the memory positivity score also replicated a 
significant interaction between age group and the Stroop 
interference score, F(2, 81) = 3.08, p = .05, η2 = .06.
Discussion
Previous research indicates that older adults tend to 
remember more positive and less negative information 
compared to younger adults (Charles et al., 2003; for a 
review see Reed et al., 2014). According to SST (Scheibe 
& Carstensen, 2010), this age-related positivity effect is 
driven by emotion regulation goals activated by the limited 
future perspective older adults hold. Given that advancing 
age is likely to lead to more limited future perspectives, 
the positivity effect should be stronger in older old adults 
than in younger old adults. While previous studies did not 
always provide evidence consistent with this prediction, 
the lack of age effects within older adults may be due to the 
age-related impairment in cognitive control. In the present 
study, we tested this prediction by examining memory for 
positive, negative and neutral images in older old adults, 
younger old adults and younger adults. Consistent with 
SST, we found that the positivity effect in memory was 
stronger for older old adults than for younger old adults. 
In addition, within a group of older old adults, a stronger 
positivity effect in memory was associated with smaller 
interference scores in a Stroop task. These results suggest 
that the positivity effect in old age is determined not 
only by one’s limited time perspective due to advancing 
age but also by preserved cognitive control mechanisms 
underlying emotion regulation.
The second goal of the present study was to test a 
prediction of another theory on the positivity effect. 
According to the aging-brain model (Cacioppo et al., 2011), 
normal aging leads to impaired amygdala function, which 
leads to impaired processing of emotionally negative 
stimuli and the apparent positivity effect in older adults. 
If this is true, older adults who show the positivity effect 
in attention or memory should show impaired emotional 
processing in other tasks that rely on the amygdala. In 
the present study, we used fear conditioning paradigms 
because acquisition of conditioned fear has been revealed 
to rely on the amygdala (e.g., Delgado et al., 2006). We 
found that across age groups, all participants acquired 
fear responses to a cue predictive of shock. In addition, the 
magnitude of fear responses acquired was not correlated 
with the positivity effect in memory. Thus, our results 
suggest that older adults who have a preserved amygdala 
function to learn fear are able to show the positivity effect 
in memory at the same time, arguing against the aging-
brain model.
While we found a positive correlation between memory 
positivity and age in the group of older adults, previous 
studies have not always found a similar positive correlation 
(M. J. Frank & Kong, 2008; Gana et al., 2015; Jivraj et al., 
2014; Simon et al., 2010). This inconsistency may be due 
to the age-related decline in cognitive control abilities; in 
other words, older old adults should generally have lower 
cognitive control abilities than younger old adults. In the 
current study, older old adults were not significantly worse 
than younger old adults in their Stroop performance, 
and older adults in both groups were equally worse than 
younger adults. Thus, our participants in the older old 
group may have been relatively cognitively preserved, 
which may have enabled us to see the positive correlation 
between memory positivity and age. These results suggest 
that it is important to take into account cognitive control 
abilities in research on the positivity effect.
While our results are consistent with SST, it is important 
to note limitations of the present study and questions 
for future research. Firstly, the amygdala function is 
not limited to fear conditioning. In addition, we did not 
incorporate any neuroimaging measures that allow us to 
examine the structural and functional preservation of the 
amygdala. Future studies need to include more systematic 
assessments on the amygdala function/structural 
preservation to address the relevance of the amygdala 
to the positivity effect in memory and attention. The 
second issue concerns our measure of cognitive control. 
Cognitive control is defined as one’s ability to coordinate 
thoughts and behaviors based on current goals (Miller 
& Cohen, 2001) which covers inhibitory control, 
performance monitoring, working memory, and goal-
directed attention. In contrast, in the current study, we 
included only the Stroop task which concerns inhibitory 
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control. Therefore, it is unclear whether the positivity 
effect in older old adults is related to performance in 
other domains of cognitive control. On the one hand, 
previous research suggests that inhibitory control is key 
for emotion regulation (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Brain 
regions that are important for inhibitory control (e.g., the 
inferior frontal gyrus; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; 
Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2008) have also been implicated 
in emotion regulation across younger and older adults (D. 
W. Frank et al., 2014; Morawetz, Bode, Derntl, & Heekeren, 
2016; Winecoff, LaBar, Madden, Cabeza, & Huettel, 2011). 
These results suggest that the positivity effect in older 
adults may rely on inhibitory control more than other 
domains of cognitive control. But emotion regulation is 
also accompanied with activation in other brain regions 
beyond those relevant to inhibitory control (D. W. Frank 
et al., 2014; Morawetz et al., 2016; Winecoff et al., 2011). 
Prevous studies also demonstrate that the positivity effect 
in memory in older adults is correlated with an executive 
composite score, based on other cognitive control 
measures and inhibitory control (Mather & Knight, 2005; 
see also Petrican et al., 2008). Future studies need to 
include more systematic assessments on cognitive control 
to test the role of inhibitory control in the positivity effect 
in older old adults.
Thirdly, our analyses based on the three age groups are 
ad-hoc analyses and we are unlikely to have sufficient 
statistical power to detect the difference between older 
old adults and younger old adults in various analyses 
reported in the paper. In fact, in the current study, 
despite younger old adults and older old adults showing 
similar performance in the Stroop task, the association 
between Stroop performance and memory positivity was 
observed only in older old adults and the correlation 
was not significant in younger old adults. This lack of a 
correlation may be due to the lack of the positivity effect 
in younger old adults in our sample: younger old adults 
did not significantly differ from younger adults in the 
proportions of positive and negative images recalled. 
While we do not have an objective measure on future 
time perspective, it is likely that younger old adults have a 
more limited future time perspective than younger adults 
do. Therefore, if the future time perspective is critical in 
the age-related positivity effect as SST predicts, younger 
old adults should show a preference towards positive over 
negative stimuli compared with younger adults. In fact, 
past studies on emotional experiences indicate better 
emotional experiences in early old adulthood relative 
to younger adulthood (Carstensen et al., 2011; Steptoe, 
Deaton, & Stone, 2015). In the current study, we also 
found that younger old adults reported a higher positive 
affect score than younger adults did, although the effect 
did not survive when we applied multiple comparisons 
(Table 1). It is unclear why we did not see a significant 
difference between younger adults and younger old 
adults in our memory measure. One possibility is that 
our sample size was too small to detect a difference after 
splitting older adults into two sub-groups. Future studies 
need to employ a larger sample size to address this issue.
Lastly, the present study is based on a cross-sectional 
comparison of age. Therefore, there may be some 
differences other than age across the age groups. In fact, 
the three groups were significantly different in WTAR 
scores, suggesting that their educational backgrounds 
or intelligence levels may be different. While the age-
related positivity effect remained significant even after 
controlling for WTAR scores, we also had a number of 
exclusion criteria, including heart disease, peripheral 
vascular disease, and diabetes. Because age is a risk factor 
for these physical diseases, it may be more challenging 
for older old adults to meet all eligibility criteria than 
younger old adults. Thus, older old adults we had in this 
study may be exceptionally healthier than younger adults 
or younger old adults and therefore the three groups may 
not be comparable with one another. Future research 
should therefore examine the effects of age in older adults 
using longitudinal paradigms.
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